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Abstract. The design and implementation of security threat mitigation mecha-
nisms in RFID systems, specially in low-cost RFID tags, are gaining great at-
tention in both industry and academia. One main focus of research interests is
the authentication and privacy techniques to prevent attacks targeting the inse-
cure wireless channel of these systems. Cryptography is a key tool to address
these threats. Nevertheless, strong hardware constraints, such as production costs,
power consumption, time of response, and regulations compliance, makes the use
of traditional cryptography in these systems a very challenging problem. The use
of low-overhead procedures becomes the main approach to solve these challeng-
ing problems where traditional cryptography cannot fit. Recent results and trends,
with an emphasis on lightweight techniques for addressing critical threats against
low-cost RFID systems, are surveyed.
Keywords: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Electronic Product Code (EPC),
Wireless Security, IT Security, Security Threats, Privacy Threats.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless communication technology, based
on analog and digital components, used to identify and track goods and people. Even
though it has been used for more than seventy years (e.g., RFID was used in World War
II for identifying enemy aircrafts), it is only now that this technology is re-emerging
as an important communication paradigm that claims to revolutionize inventory and
automation processes [61]. Examples are the use of RFID for supply chain inventory,
health care management, animal identification, and anti-counterfeiting. However, while
this technology is gaining importance with industrial suppliers, security and privacy
concerns are raising, especially, among RFID consumers and end users.
An example is the introduction of low-cost RFID technology in the supply chain of the
retail industry by means of the Electronic Product Code (EPC) concept. The EPC is a
unique code associated to a passive RFID tag that is placed on shipment pallets. The
ability to identify and track these pallets, and their associated products, raise security
and privacy concerns. These concerns become critical as retailers and manufacturers
contemplate moving from pallet tagging to individual item tagging [61]. The possibility
of rogue monitoring of people carrying these items is stimulating security and privacy
research in both industry and academia. The insertion of cryptographic mechanisms in
low-cost RFID tags is a promising solution to address the aforementioned concerns.
However, current state-of-the-art solutions in cryptography must face significant chal-
lenges before being deployed in RFID technologies.
According to a research presented by Sarma in [62], the maximum cost of passive EPC
tags should not exceed five cents to enable successful deployment on a world wide scale.
This research also states that of these five cents, only one or two cents should be used for
the manufacturing of the Integrated Circuit (IC). It is assumed that the available layout
area for the implementation of the IC is in the range of 0.25mm2 which, considering
current CMOS technology, translate to a theoretical number of logic gates from two
to four thousand. Not all the barriers investigated in [62] have been removed. The low-
cost RFID technology of today is more expensive than what it was anticipated— around
ten cents in large quantities. The inclusion of additional RFID features, especially for
authentication and privacy purposes, may increase the total end-cost of tags up to fifteen
cents or more per unit. Although Moore’s Law predicts that digital devices fabricated
on ICs will continue decreasing in price, cost of analogue devices (i.e., RF front-end
of tags) will remain a constraint [12]. The inclusion of new elements must therefore be
well planned.
Since the power used by low-cost RFID (passive) tags is derived from the signal re-
ceived from readers, power restrictions also apply. The power consumption of a tag
varies according to the nature of the operation being performed (e.g., responding to
a query or writing data into the memory) and other parameters like the transmission
rate, response time, and memory technology. Most of the operations performed in EPC
tags require about five to ten microamps — although some special operations, such as
writing operations, may require higher power. The power consumption of new security
primitives must be within this range in order to allow low-cost tag production.
New security primitives must also work at the data rate of EPC applications. Current
EPC applications demand an average reading speed of about two hundred tags per sec-
ond. That leads to a data transmission rate requirement from tag to reader, of about
640 kbps; and a transmission rate from reader to tag of about 120 kbps. Delays asso-
ciated to new security mechanisms (e.g., time to perform encryption or random num-
ber generation) may also affect the global performance. Delays must hence be taken
into account and minimized. We can find in the literature several solutions that provide
authentication and privacy mechanisms while meeting these challenging constraints.
Most of the solutions can be classified in the following three categories: (1) lightweight
cryptography based on the use of one-way hash-like primitives implemented in tags;
(2) low-overhead and ultra-lightweight cryptography relying on the single use of on-
tag pseudorandomness and simple arithmetic operations; and (3) alternative solutions
avoiding the execution of cryptographic processes within tags. We survey, in the sequel,
recent contributions and trends according to these three categories. Our work aims at
increasing the awareness of available security threat mitigation methods among RFID
researchers and developers.
Paper organization. Section 2 surveys one-way hash-like solutions. Section 3 surveys
proposals based on the single use of on-tag pseudorandomness and simple arithmetic
operations. Section 4 surveys alternative approaches not requiring the necessity of on-
tag cryptographic processes. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Lightweight Cryptographic Approaches
MAC (Message Authentication Code) based security protocols are among the first so-
lutions discussed in the literature for securing low-cost RFID applications. In [65], for
example, Takaragi et al. present a simple MAC-based approach that uses a static un-
rewritable 128-bit identifier stored, at manufacturing time, in every tag. The identifier
is generated by the manufacturer using a unique secret key for each tag and a keyed
hash function that accepts as input the secret key and a specific message. The secret
key, hash function, and specific messages are communicated by the manufacturer to the
client. Then, this information is shared among the clients’ readers, to verify the integrity
and authenticity of the exchanged messages. Therefore, this mechanism increases the
technical difficulties of performing attacks against the integrity and authenticity of the
messages. The main drawback is the use of static identifiers embedded in the tags at
manufacturing time. Therefore, brute force attacks can break the secrets shared between
readers and tags.
An enhanced solution relies on the use of hash-lock schemes for implementing access
controls. In [69], Weis et al. propose a way to prevent unauthorized readers from reading
tag contents. A secret is sent by authorized readers to tags using a trusted environment.
Tags, equipped with an internal hash function, perform a hash on this secret and store it
within their internal memory. Then, tags enter into a locked state in which they answer
to any possible query with the computed hash. Weis et al. also describe proper ways of
unlocking tags, if such an action is needed by authorized readers (i.e., to temporarily
release private data). Regarding privacy threats, Ohkubo et al. propose in [49] the use
of hash chains for the implementation of on-tag security mechanisms with evolving
RFID identities. Avoine and Oechslin discuss in [2] some limitations of the approach.
They propose an enhanced hash-based RFID protocol to address both authentication
and privacy by using timestamps. Similarly, Henrici and Müller discuss in [25] some
weaknesses in the hash-lock scheme presented in [69] and propose a new hash-based
scheme intended to enhance privacy and authentication. Several other improvements
and hash-based protocols, most of them inspired on lightweight cryptography research
for devices with higher hardware capabilities such as smart cards, can be found in [48,
16, 43, 53].
2.1 Hardware Challenges and Limitations
Let us note that the aforementioned approaches require the implementation of one-way
hash primitives within low-cost RFID tags. The requirement of reliable hash primitives
implemented at the tag level is the main challenge associated with these proposals. Gate
requirements of implementations based on standard one-way hash functions, such as
MD4, MD5, and SHA-128/SHA-256, exceed the constraints pointed out in Section 1.
The implementation of these functions require from seven thousand to over ten thousand
logic gates; and from six hundred to over one thousand two hundred clock cycles [53].
The complexity of standard one-way hash functions is therefore an impediment for their
deployment on low-cost RFID tags.
The use of standard encryption engines for the construction of hash operations has been
discussed in the literature. For example, the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC)
[47] for the implementation of one-way hash primitives on RFID tags has been studied
in [72]. Its use of small key sizes is seen as very promising for providing an adequate
level of computational security at a relatively low cost [12]. An ECC implementation
for low-cost RFID tags can be found in [4]. In [21], Feldhofer et al. present a 128-bit im-
plementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [14] on an IC of about three
thousand five hundred gates with a power consumption of less than nine microamps
at a frequency of 100 kHz. Although this implementation is considerably simpler than
previous implementations of the AES algorithm, its requirements are still too high for
low-cost RFID tags.
Alternative hash functions based on non-standard low-cost encryption engines is a third
candidate. In [29], Israsena presents a hardware implementation of the Tiny Encryption
Algorithm (TEA) [70] on an IC of about three thousand gates and with a consumption
of about seven microamps. It fits the timing requirements of basic EPC setups where
hundred of tags must simultaneously be accessed by the same reader. The implemen-
tation relies on very simple arithmetic and bitwise operators. The authors of TEA [70]
claim that, despite its simplicity and ease of implementation, the complexity of the al-
gorithm is equivalent to the one of DES (Data Encryption Standard) [47]. Variants of
the TEA algorithm are, however, necessary for implementing hash functions. Mace et
al. discuss in [46] some of the vulnerabilities of TEA, such as linear and differential
cryptanalysis attacks, and present SEA (Scalable Encryption Algorithm). The strength
of this proposal, due to its novelty, is not clear [12].
Other low-cost alternatives are the single use of Linear and Non Linear Feedback Shift
Registers (LFSR&NLFSR). However, the simple use of LFSR&NLFSR as underlying
mechanisms for the implementation of low-cost one-way hash functions — without
further measures that add cost of extra hardware — lead to insecure implementations.
For example, the use of the Cellular Automata (CA) model [71] for the implementation
of one-way functions — typically built upon LFSR & NLFSR — has been proved to
lead to insecure implementations [5, 12].
2.2 Physical One-Way Functions
The design of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Physical Obfuscated Keys
(POKs) is promising for the implementation of hash-like protocols on low-cost EPC
tags. Half way between traditional cryptography and physical protection defenses, the
ideas behind PUFs and POKs originated in [51] with the conception of optical mecha-
nisms for the construction of Physical One-Way Functions (POWFs). Its use to securely
store unique secret keys, in the form of fabrication variations, was proposed as a silicon
prototype in [23]. The ideas were later improved in [45]. A coating PUF proposed in
[64] claims an implementation that requires less than one thousand gates. The designs
exploit the random variations in delays of wires and logic gates of an IC. For example,
the silicon PUF presented in [23] receives input data, as a challenge, and launches a race
condition within the IC: two transitions signals start propagating along different paths
and are compared to determine which one comes first. To decide which signal comes
first, a special controller produces a binary value.
The implementation of these proposals seems to have clear advantages at a cost of less
than one thousand logic gates [64]. This technology provides a cost effective and re-
liable solution that successfully meet the constraints and requirements mentioned in
Section 1. However, it also has several drawbacks. The difficulty of successfully mod-
eling the circuits and their reliability is one of the obstacles that this technology must
to face. The effects of environmental conditions and effects of the power supply volt-
age have also raised some concerns [12]. Some alternative proposals try to solve the
drawbacks. Holcomb et al. propose in [26] an approach based on the CMOS SRAM
memory of an electrical to generate physical fingerprints. The key idea is the usage of
SRAM startup values as seeds of pseudorandomness. The authors claim that the use
of 256 bytes of SRAM can yield 100 bits of true randomness each time the memory
is powered up. While sound in theory, this technique is limited by memory space of
current low-cost tags.
Challenge-response protocols are commonly used to implement security mechanisms
in low-cost RFID tags using PUFs. An initial approach presented in [58], and based on
PUFs proposed in [23], consists of a challenge-response scheme that probabilistically
ensures unique identification of RFID tags. The back-end system of this approach must
learn challenge-response pairs for each PUF/tag. It then uses these challenges (hundreds
of them) at a time, to identify and authenticate tags. Unique identification of tags is
probabilistic. The exposition of tag identifiers to eavesdroppers, and lack of state and
randomness in tag responses, make the approach vulnerable to tracking and location
threats. Moreover, the great number of challenges that are necessary between readers
and tags for the completion of the identification process increases tag response delay
and power consumption.
An alternative protocol is presented in [67]. Tuyls and Batina discuss an off-line PUF-
based mechanism for verifying the authenticity of tags using the PUF technology pre-
sented in [64]. Similarly to the traditional approaches presented in [31, 36], where read-
ers and tags define ad hoc secrets, the PUF-based approach uses instead the physical
structure embedded within tags to generate unique keys. A key extraction algorithm
from noisy (binary) data is presented in [67]. The usage of PUF-based keys simplifies
the process of verifying tag authenticity. The combination of unique keys generated on-
board together with public key cryptography techniques (e.g., use of signatures) avoid
leaking the static single identifier and hence increase the technical difficulties for an
attacker to carry on location tracking threats. The main drawback of the approach is
the need of large storage space and reliable searching processes on back-end servers in
order to link readers with PUF/tag identifiers. The use of public key and digital signa-
tures, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), is another important constraint of
the approach.
Bolotnyy and Robins propose in [6] a complete set of adapted MAC protocols based
on PUFs aiming to simplify the challenge-response communication scheme of previous
proposals, and the requirement of traditional cryptographic primitives. Each tag gener-
ates multiple identifiers based on embedded PUFs. The approach only addresses static
identification and is vulnerable to location tracking attacks. The approach does not solve
the necessity of huge lists of challenge-response pairs for each PUF/tag which must be
stored on back-servers connected to the readers. Indeed, once a given pair is sent, it
must not be used anymore. Otherwise, the protocol cannot guarantee that an adversary
eavesdropping data will not gain advantage by performing a replay attack.
3 Low-overhead and Ultra-lightweight Solutions
The use of on-tag Pseudo Random Numbers Generators (PRNGs) to enhance the secu-
rity and privacy of RFID systems is another candidate. In fact, most of the approaches,
if not all, presented in Section 2 require the use of PRNGs to guarantee correctness.
For example, the enhanced hash-lock scheme presented by Weis et al. in [69] relies
on the use of on-tag PRNGs and efficient pseudorandomness for mitigating privacy
threats like location tracking. Another example is the need of combining PRNGs and
hash chains to enable the proposal of Ohkubo et al. presented in [49]. More recently, a
protocol presented in [66], called YA-TRAP, reduces the need of hash-based protocols
by combining pre-computed hash-tables for tag verification processes with timestamps
and generation of pseudorandom numbers. Similar requirements apply on all the other
protocols surveyed in Section 2— in order to address location tracking problems. From
a hardware point-of-view, the insertion of robust one-way hash functions and PRNGs in
the constrained environment of low-cost RFID tags makes the implementation of those
proposals very challenging and, unrealistic for real world applications.
The use of pseudorandomness for increasing low-cost RFID security is often ques-
tioned because robust designs are complex to implement on low-cost RFID devices.
The complexity of the implementation of robust PRNGs is equivalent to the complexity
of the implementation of robust one-way hash-functions and/or equivalent encryption
engines [47]. However, since the ratification of the EPCglobal standard EPC Class-1
Generation-2 (Gen2 for short) [20] and ISO standards ISO/IEC 18000-6C [28] for the
usage of on-tag PRNGs on low-cost RFID devices, the number of single PRNG-based
solutions has increased in the industry and academia research. The existence of PRNG
hardware already deployed on most of the low-cost RFID tags justifies the convenience
of this second category of security threat mitigation mechanisms.
Juels and Weis present in [36] an unidirectional authentication protocol based on the se-
cure human identification protocol series proposed by Hopper and Blum [27]. The new
protocol, called by the authors HB+, aims at preventing active attacks against the au-
thenticity of low-cost RFID systems. The resistance of HB+ against active adversaries
is proved by the authors using an statistical conjecture [13] to bound the difficulty of
learning a secret (e.g., ID of the tag) given a sequence of randomly chosen vectors with
embedded noisy information. The authors claim that the protocol can be implemented
on low-cost tags since it only requires PRNG primitives in tags and implementation
of very simple operations, such as bitwise-and and xor. Some security issues of the
HB+ protocol were reported in [39, 57]. They propose enhancements to address active
attacks. However, neither the original HB+ protocol nor its sequels consider authen-
tication of the readers and location tracking attacks. Regarding these issues, we can
find in [38] a new low-overhead protocol by Karthikeyan and Nesterenko for mutual
authentication of tags and readers. The requirements of this protocol are modular alge-
bra operations, such as multiplication of matrices, and on-tag PRNG primitives. Based
on similar requirements, such as on-tag PRNG and matrix algebra operations, Dolev
et al. present in [17] two low-overhead proactive unidirectional protocols, called PISP
(Proactive Informational Secure Protocol) and PCSP (Proactive Computationally Se-
cure Protocol), with evolving on-tag secrets that expands indefinitely over time. Both
PISP and PCSP are compared and contrasted in a joint publication appeared in [19].
The security of these protocols relies on the difficulty of recovering the operands used
on both sides (tags and readers) to synchronize shared secrets. Memory space on current
low-cost tags is another limitation to the security of these approaches. An enhanced ver-
sion of the PCSP protocol, presented in [18], aims at preventing active attacks against
the protocol while keeping similar requirements, i.e., on-tag PRNG primitives and ma-
trix operations.
Burmester, Le, and de Medeiros proposed in [7] a new low-overhead protocol, called
O-TRAP (Optimistic Trivial RFID Authentication Protocol). Like other protocols sur-
veyed in this section, O-TRAP relies on the use of PRNG primitives in tags and some
other simple bitwise operations. O-TRAP is specially designed to prevent privacy at-
tacks while guaranteeing anonymous authentication. The protocol behaves in a manner
similar to the hash-lock approach introduced in Section 2. Common secret, shared be-
tween readers and tags, are proposed in their scheme to update pseudonyms stored
within tags. Like in the hash-lock approach introduced by Weis et al. in [69], readers
must access back-end databases to map pseudonyms to true identities. The security of
the protocol is proved using the universal composability (UC) model [8]. It is shown that
the O-TRAP protocol meets the UC definition of anonymous authentication and anony-
mous key exchange. However, the O-TRAP protocol fails to satisfy the stronger privacy
definitions, such the one stated by Juels and Weis in [37] establishing that privacy coun-
termeasures must guarantee both anonymity and untraceability. Juels andWeis point out
the possibility of attacking the O-TRAP protocol by de-synchronizing tags. This allow
active attacker to uniquely identify them and carry on location tracking attacks. An
attack against the untraceability of the O-TRAP protocol is presented in [50].
Similar attacks exploit existing vulnerabilities in the state-of-the-art of the ultra-light-
weight series of authentication protocols. Ultra-lightweight authentication protocols,
such as [54–56, 11], try to eliminate the necessity of hash and PRNG primitives, and
involve only simple bitwise and modular arithmetic on-tag operations. The computation
of costly operations, such as the generation of pseudorandom numbers, is done at the
reader side. Although this fact benefits the implementation of such countermeasures on
the constrained environment of low-cost RFID tags, none of these proposals seems to
be resistant to either active or passive attacks. The set of authentication techniques pre-
sented by Peris-Lopez et al. in [54–56] were reported to be vulnerable by Li and Wang,
and Li and Deng to, respectively, the de-synchronization attacks and full-disclosure at-
tacks. Improvements of these techniques, presented by Chien in a new protocol called
SASI [11] have recently been reported as vulnerable by Cao, Bertino, and Lei in [9].
These recent cases show how challenging it is to design adequate procedures given the
low-cost requirement of the RFID paradigm.
4 Avoidance of On-tag Cryptographic Processes
Several results, such as [32, 40, 30, 31], are not relying on the execution of crypto-
graphic algorithms in tags. One of the earliest proposals is the re-encryption scheme
of Juels and Pappu presented in [32]. It provides privacy and security for banknotes
embedding RFID tags. The approach uses public key cryptography and digital signa-
tures. The operations are, although, performed outside the tags. The scheme consists of
a public-key cryptosystem and two authorities: a central bank and a law enforcement
agency. Both authorities hold an independent pair of public and private keys associated
to each banknote. The central bank authority assigns a unique serial number to each
banknote. To do so, the bank uses its private key to sign the unique serial number. The
signature and the serial number of the banknote are printed on the banknote as optical
data. Then, by using the public key of the law enforcement agency, the bank encrypts
the digital signature, unique serial number, and a random number. The resulting cipher-
text is stored into a memory cell of the RFID tag. This memory cell is keyed-protected.
The tag only grants write access to this memory cell if it receives an access key derived
from the optical data. The random number used to create the ciphetext is also stored into
a separated memory cell of the tag. This second memory cell is also keyed-protected.
The tag only grants read or write access to this memory cell if it receives an access key
derived from the optical data.
By using this previous approach, banknote bearers must verify first the digital signature,
printed in the banknote as optical data, using the public key of the central bank. Second,
they must also verify the validity of the ciphertext stored in the RFID tag. To do so, the
bearer encrypts the digital signature, serial number, and random number stored in the
memory of the tag, using the public key of the law enforcement agency and the optical
data. If one of these two verification processes fails, the authorities must be warned. To
avoid using the same ciphertext on every interaction, the authors propose the use of a
re-encryption process that can be performed by banknote bearers without the necessity
of accessing the private keys of the law enforcement authority. Based on the algebraic
properties of the El Gamal cryptosystem [47], the initial ciphertext is transformed into
a new unlinkable ciphertext, using the public key of the law enforcement authority [32].
This re-encryption process is performed outside the tags. Although the whole process
is too complex for use in low-cost RFID scenarios, it is one of the first solutions that
appeared in the literature for deploying cryptographic protocols in RFID applications
without the need to embed cryptographic primitives in tags.
The work presented by Kinosita et al. in [40] consists of an anonymous ID scheme,
in which a tag contains only a pseudonym that is periodically rewritten. Similarly, the
approach of Juels in the work Minimalist Cryptography for Low-Cost RFID Tags [30]
suggests a very light-weight protocol for mutual authentication between tags and read-
ers based on one-time authenticators. Both solutions rely on the use of pseudonyms
and keys stored within tags and back-end servers. Pseudonyms are used instead of real
identifiers (e.g., instead of the EPC codes in supply chain RFID applications). Each tag
contains a small collection of pseudonyms, according to the available memory. A throt-
tling process, is used to rotate these pseudonyms. Each time a tag is interrogated by a
reader, a different pseudonym selected at random is returned. Authorized readers have
access to the complete list of pseudonyms of each tag and can correlate the identity
of the responses they receive. Without the knowledge of this list, unauthorized readers
are unable to infer any information about the numerous occurrences of the same tag.
The process also forces tags to slow their transmissions when queries come too quickly,
as a defense to brute-force attacks. The memory space in current low-cost tags is the
main limitation of this approach. Although enhancements can be used to update the list
of pseudonyms, communication costs and integrity threats still remain as main draw-
backs. A similar, though lighter-weight, protocol for mutual authentication between
readers and tags is presented by Juels in [31]. This time, the Personal Identification
Number (PIN), associated to the kill command of EPC Gen2 tags [20], is used to im-
plement the protocol. The main idea is that even if the EPC data of a tag is skimmed,
the PIN remains secret. This way, cloned tags can be detected by testing, without killing
the tag, if the kill password matches the original one stored in a back-end database. The
risk of exposing the kill PIN of a given tag is however an important drawback of this
approach.
Many signal-, power-, and blocking-based defenses, such as shielding of tags, use of
noise, and third party guardians, can be found in the literature. The use of distance
measurements to detect rogue readers has been discussed in [22]. Fishkin et al. pro-
pose the inclusion of low-cost circuitry in tags to use the signal-to-noise ratio of readers
as a metric for trust. In [24], a similar assumption is used to determine if a reader is
authorized to read the tag contents according to its physical distance. Castelluccia and
Avoine propose in [10] the use of additional tags with better hardware capabilities than
low-cost RFID hardware capabilities, to generate noise on the communication channel
between readers and low-cost tags. The objective is to thwart possible eavesdroppers.
Similar software-based blocking strategies can be found in [34, 60]. Third party compo-
nents with cryptographic features to perform authentication and acting as intermediaries
between readers and tags have been proposed in [59, 35]. The management of these
components in real world scenarios like the supply chain of the retail industry is a prob-
lem and the main drawback of these proposals. Finally, the use of radio fingerprinting
to detect characteristic properties of transmitted signals has also been considered in the
literature. Cole and Ranasinghe [12] consider, however, that this technique is difficult to
develop in RFID applications and that the benefits of using it, regarding performance,
price and required implementation surface in tags, are unclear. Avoine and Oechslin
discuss in [1] the prevention of traceability attacks via radio fingerprinting. They also
conclude that obtaining radio fingerprints of tag is very expensive and difficult. The
myriad of tags in circulation in future RFID scenarios would make impracticable the
distinction of tags.
4.1 Towards Secret-Sharing Strategies
As an evolution of the minimalist cryptography approach presented by Juels in [30], and
using lists of pseudonyms, the use of secret-sharing schemes is proposed by Langhein-
rich and Martin in [41, 42] for solving authentication and privacy threats in low-cost
RFID scenarios (e.g., supply chain applications of the retail industry). The work pre-
sented in [41] simplifies the lookup process performed from readers to back-end data-
bases for identifying tags, while guaranteeing authentication and tracking resistance.
Tag identifiers, seen in this work as the secrets, are encoded as a set of shares and
stored in the internal memory of tags. The mechanism used by the authors to encode
the shares is based on the (t-n)-threshold schemes of Shamir [63]. When the shares are
cryptographically combined at the reader side, original tag identifiers are reconstructed.
To prevent brute-force scanning from unauthorized readers — trying to obtain the com-
plete set of shares — the authors propose a time-limited access that controls the amount
of data sent from tags to readers. At the same time, a cache based process ensures that
authorized readers quickly identify tags. Langheinrich and Martin extended the pre-
vious proposal to spread the set of shares across multiple tags [42]. Still based on the
Shamir’s secret sharing schemes, this approach encodes the indentifier of an item tagged
with multiple RFID devices by distributing it into multiple shares stored within its tags.
Authentication and privacy are enforced by requiring readers to obtain and combine the
set of shares.
In [33], Juels, Pappu, and Parno present another secret-sharing based approach, but
based on a dispersion of secrets strategy rather than an aggregation strategy — as used
by Langheinrich and Marti in [41, 42]. Two different schemes are discussed: dispersion
of secrets across space and dispersion of secrets across time. In both schemes, a se-
cret that is used to encrypt RFID identifiers (e.g., the EPC codes) is split in multiple
shares and distributed among multiple parties. The construction and recombination of
shares are based on the use of error-correcting codes. In order to identify a tag, a party
must collect a number of shares. Privacy is achieved by the dispersion of secrets and
encrypted identifiers. The dispersion approach helps to improve the authentication pro-
cess between readers and tags, as tags move through a supply chain. Assuming that a
given number of shares is necessary for a reader to obtain the EPC codes assigned to
a pallet, for example, a situation where the number of shares obtained by a reader is
not sufficient to reach the threshold leads to conclude that unauthorized tags are present
on the pallet. The approaches presented in [33] increase the resistance of tags against
unauthorized scanning by dispersing tag populations outside the supply chain. Without
the space proximity to other tags with equivalent shares, an unauthorized reader cannot
obtain the sufficient number of shares required to recover the original identifier of tags
and items. A clear advantage of this approach is that it can be implemented on low-cost
RFID tags, such as EPC Gen2 [20] tags, without requiring changes to the current spec-
ifications. Only an upgrade of readers is necessary. No real-world tests of the proposals
have been conducted. The authors claim, although, that experiments for pharmaceutical
products in a closed-loop supply chain are going to be conducted in the future. The
main drawback of this approach is the amount of tag memory space required for storing
the shares. A shrinking of key shares must be performed a priori in order to apply the
scheme on current EPC tags. Other problems, such as tracking and information leaks
due to the interaction between authorized readers and tags, must also be solved before
deploying the schemes.
5 Conclusions
The constrained environment and threat model associated to low-cost RFID tags have
stimulated the creation of a vast number of proposals to provide low-overhead security
threat mitigation mechanisms in these devices. Vulnerable designs appeared in recent
literature, such as the lightweight authentication protocols presented by Vajda and But-
tyán in [68] (whose vulnerabilities were recently reported by Defend, Fu, and Juels in
[15]), the set of ultra-lightweight authentication techniques presented by Peris-Lopez et
al. in [54–56] (which were reported as vulnerable to passive [3] and active [44] attacks),
and enhancements of these proposals, like the SASI protocol [11] (recently reported by
Cao, Bertino, and Lei in [9] as vulnerable), show how challenging it is to design ade-
quate procedures given the constraints. We surveyed lightweight defenses that can be
useful to reduce the risk of threats. We addressed the methods according to three differ-
ent perspectives: (1) one way hash-like defenses, (2) solutions relying on the single use
of on-tag pseudorandomness and simple arithmetic operations; and (3) mechanisms not
requiring the execution of cryptographic processes in the tags.
Regarding the first perspective, we pointed out the hardware challenges which to the
best of our knowledge, are important obstacles for deployment in real world low-cost
RFID scenarios like the supply chain of the retail industry. Physical One-Way Functions
(POWFs) and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising evolution of
traditional hash-based protocols, but at a feasible production cost. Their sensitivity to
physical noise, the large number of challenges and training session between readers and
tags to guarantee adequate identification, and the difficulty to model and analyze, are
open lines of research. In the second perspective, we pointed out the memory space and
de-synchronization flaws as main limitations. The evolution of these solutions toward
strategies that avoid the execution of on-tag cryptographic processes is heading recent
researches. We pointed out the use of secret sharing strategies as a promising foundation
for the management of keys for the design of authentication protocols and for dealing
with privacy issues. Main drawbacks are the management of information leaks due to
the interaction between readers and tags, and tracking of tags.
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